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TE OF UTAH, 
ie Interest of: 
yGIRL McMURTREY, 
v. 
!ES N. THOMAS, 
Appellant. 
No. 11607 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by James N. Thomas, the father 
W Girl McMurtrey, from the decision of the Second 
ltrict Juvenile Court, State of Utah, the Honorable 
•nal W. Garff presiding, which terminated all parental 
of the appellant in his daughter on the sole ground 
I 
It although he was the natural father of Baby Girl 




desire for custody of her, he was not the legal father 
under the "laws of Utah," had no parental rights in 
child. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On December 23, 1968 a petition for the permanent 
rivation of all parental rights of Baby Girl McMurtrey 
1 filed in the Second District Juvenile Court. After a 
ring on February 26, 1969, the matter was taken under 
isement by the Court. On March 7, 1969 Appellant 
d a petition reaffirming his paternity requesting custody 
1aid child. By Decree and Order entered April 3, 1969, 
parental rights of both the Appellant and the mother of 
were permanently terminated and legal custody 
!guardianship of said child was placed in the Division 
' 
family Services for placement in a suitable adoptive 
le. The sole basis for the termination of Appellant's 
rights was the fact that he was not the legal 
of Baby Girl McMurtrey. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant desires this Court to reverse the 
. 2. 
... 011 of the Juvenile Court after determining that 
the juvenile Court Act the only basis for termination 
'parental rights are those set forth in Section 55-10-
(l)(a)(b) or (c), Utah Code Annotated 1953 and, not 
iing rhe legal father not being one of those conditions, 
the Juvenile Court to hold a further hearing to 
into the existence of those conditions or terminate 
I 
'ijurisdiction over Baby Girl McMurtrey and inquiry into 
I 
Is matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Baby Girl McMurtrey was born December 20, 1968 
:Kathleen McMurtrey and the Appellant, James N. Thomas. 
of the child were unmarried both at the time 
It the child was conceived and at the time that the child 
The parents had been married to each other 
Im June 17, 1958 till in 1963, (R. 27 -28) and planned 
remarried after the birth of the Baby Girl McMurtrey 
a home for their child. (R. 28-29). However, 
lir plans were frustrated by the trauma of having the 
seized and taken from their custody three days after 
! 
. 3. 
ier birth and then facing the permanent deprivation 
ietition in the Juvenile Court. (R. 28-29-57). A hearing 
held on the allegations of the petition on February 26, 
[969. (R. 1 ). The whole hearing concerned the allegations 
I 
petition dealing with the emotional inability of the 
niother to care for her child. (R. 1-37). The only inquiry 
lbout the appellant was as to his marital status. However, 
the Court recognized him as the father of the child j, 
jR. 1), he acknowledged his paternity and stated that he 
I 
the care, custody and control of his child. (R. 27 -38) 
I . 
was not questioned about his ability to do so. The sole 
'nqUtry by the Court and the County Attorney was whether 
I 





Thereafter, on March 7, 1969 appellant filed his 
retition for custody with the Juvenile Court. He supported 
with his affidavit acknowledging paternity of Baby Girl 
rcMurtrey and requesting custody of her to be granted to 
rim. (R. 48-50). On March 13, 1969 appellant filed a 
!supplemental affidavit stating that he had a home for his 
. . 4. 
Id, that he had purchased furniture and clothing to care 
' 
1
ber, and requesting that a home study be made to 
his fitness to care for his child. 
The Court entered its Findings of Fact and Decree 
[ninating the parental interests of the Appellant and 
IDleen McMurtrey on April 3, 1969. (R. 44-45). The ·1 1 
for terminating the parental rights of the 
,ellant was that he was not the legal father of Baby Girl 
Findings of Fact #3 (1) and (2).1 The petition 
' I 
'Custody was denied without hearing by an order also 
ered April 3, 1969. (R. 46 ). 
The basis of the Juvenile Court's decision to 
piinate the parental rights of Kathleen McMurtrey was 
temotional inability to care for the child. (R. 44-45). 





THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT, 
ALTHOUGH APPELLANT IS THE NATURAL FATHER, 
also the comment of the Court on this point quoted 
(R. 37). 




HE IS NOT THE LEGAL FATHER ANO, THEREFORE, 
dAS NO LEGAL RIGHTS TO HIS CHILD, AND THE 
CHILD MAY BE PLACED FOR ADOPTION. 
' The Findings and Decree dated April 3, 1969, 
ie as the only reason for permanently depriving appellant 
ul parental rights to the child, the fact that he was not 
rried to the child's mother at the time of the child's 
Findings of Fact #3 (1) and (2) (R. 44-45). 
)Judge Garff stated during the hearing: 
i 
i "[suppose; technically, the child is an illegitimate 
I child and the . . . statute of course states that the 
: fathers of illegitimate children have no legal rights 
i to the children." (R. 37) 
i 
i THERE IS NO PROVISION IN THE JUVENILE COURT 
i ACT THAT PROVIDES THAT THE FATHER OF AN 
l
i ILLEGITIMATE CHILD HAS NO PARENTAL RIGHTS 
IN THAT CHILD AND THE JUVENILE COURTS 
!TERMIN}\TION OF HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS UPON , SUCH A SUPPOSED PROVISION IS ERROR WHICH 
I MUST BE REVERSED. . . 
l Examination of the Juvenile Court Act of 1965, 
I 
55-10-63 through 123, Utah Code Annotated, 
I 
reveals that there is no provision that provides that 
father of an illegitimate child has no parental rights 




: . 6. 
' . 
'upon the assumption and belief that such a provision 
'1 'rexisted, the error is obvious and must be reversed by this 
:,court. 
Such a provision was a part of the adoption statutes2 
the State of Utah until 1966, but it was repealed at that 
fime. It is clear that the District Court applying the 
provisions would be applying the standards of the 
Code, Section 78-30-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 in terminating parental rights and permitting an 
! 
On the other hand the Juvenile Court would apply 
I 
standards of the Juvenile Court Act, Section 55-10-63 · 
I 
in terminating parental rights and declaring a 
I 
eligible for adoption. 3 Each of these codes, the 
I 
Code, Section 78-30-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated 
ts3, and the Juvenile Court Act, Section 55-10-63 et seq. 
I 
Fh Code Annotated, 1953, would be the Legislative 
ction 78-30-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated ,1953. 
55-10-78, Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides in 
!t: "Nothing contained in this act shall deprive the Ii trier Courts of jurisdiction in adoptive proceedings." : . 7. r: 
I 
v ,., 
of different policies, and, therefore could have 
standards for the termination of parental rights. 
the fact that the Adoption Code contained until 
J66 the provision apparently relied upon by the Juvenile 
vurt in this case would not permit the Juvenile Court 
roceeding under its own act to apply a statute outside 
is clear error and must be prohibited by 
., 
Court. Appellant will admit that the issue as to whether , 
f not the delineation of parental rights spelled out in 
78-30-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is to 
I 
back to the actions of the Juvenile courts or 
I 
the Juvenile courts are to proceed solely upon their 
Court Statutes, Section 55-10-63, et seq. Utah 
I 
Annotated, 1953, has never been resolved by this 
I 
" lurt, but the very fact that they are two separate codes 
teak for themselves. ·rn addition there is that provision 
Section 55-10-78, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, set out 
!footnote #3 which clearly .indicates each is s.eparate 
! r should be read to govern the cases presented to the 
t • 8. 
i 
ren courts respectively. Thus Section 78-30-1 et seq. 
rh Code Annotated 1953, being part of the Judicial Code 
govern actions in the District Court, while Section 
I 
et seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, constituting 
juvenile Court Act should govern the Juvenile Courts. 
provisions of the one should not be read into the other 
rd if the Juvenile Court did so in the instant case, 




Since, as noted above, there is no provision in the 
! 
rvenile Court Act that provides that the father of an 
child has no parental rights in said child, 
i 
rne should be inserted by means of the Judicial Code, if 
rch a provision is found to exist in that code. The policy 
I 
the Juvenile Court Act, as expressed in Section 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is not the same as 
of the Judicial Code. As discussed in Point I (C) of 
is brief, the policy of the Juvenile Court Act is to 
erve the best interests of the child. These clearly include 
e establishment of a normal home with his natural parents.:· 
• 9. 
.,. 
would be precluded if the rule of the Judicial Code 
that the natural fathers of illegitimate children 
110 parental rights in said children, if said provision 
5 found to be the rule of that code, is held to be part of 
juvenile Courts Act. As discussed below, appellant .1, 
maintain this is not the current rule of the Judicial 
fode though it has been the rule in the past. In any event 
f should not, by this court, be read into and nade part 
I 
Juvenile Court Act even if it is found to still constitute 
re rule of the Judicial Code. 
Until 1966 it was clear that under the provisions of 
I 
78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the Judicial 
provisions governing adoptions, an illegitimate child 
I 
'ould be adopted upon the consent of only the mother; 
putative father had no standing in regard to such child. 
I 
t 
v. Children's Aid Society of Ogden, 12 Utah 2d 
35, 239; 364 P. 2d 1029 (1961). Section 78-30-4, Utah 
ode Annotated, 1953 provided: 
"A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent 
of its parents, if living, nor an illegitimate child without 
the consent of its mother, if living ... " 
. 10. 
rver, this provision was amended in 1966 to provide: 
"A child cannot be adopted without the consent 
of each living parent having rights in relation to said 
child . • • " 
I This court had held prior to said amendment that 
I 
I -
natural. parents have primary and superior rights 
their children this right may be surrendered or lost. 
i:.::re.:...:: A:....:d_op!-t_io_n_of_D-===-' 122 Utah 525, 536, 252 P. 2d 
(1953). It could be lost voluntarily, Miller v. Miller, 
rah 2d 290, 333 P. 2d 945 (1959), In re Adoption of 
, supra, or involuntarily through abandonment, 
son v. Pierce, 14 Utah 2d 317, 383 P. 2d 925 (1963) 
Application of Conde, 10 Utah 2d 25, 347 P. 2d 859 (1959) 
through court determination of unfitness. State in the 
B 7 Utah 2d 398, 362 P. 2d 395, 
Brown, 2 Utah 2d 30, 279 P. 2d --------
' reh. den. 2 Utah 2d 334, 273 P. 2d 185 (1954). 
e the parents have agreed to voluntarily permit 
mination of their parental rights and the adoption of 
ir child, this permission is usually final. Thomas v . 
• ll. 
Aid Society of Ogden, supra. Miller v. Miller, 
rra, 111 re Adoption of D. supra. Only extreme 
permit the setting aside of that consent. 
1 
o. v. Social Service & Child Welfare Department, 
2d 311, 431 P. 2d 547 (1967). 
It is also established that the Juvenile courts have 
I to terminate parental rights and declare 
I 
eligible for adoption. State in the Interest of 
I 
I 
B. supra, Devereaux v. Brown, supra. With the 
ception of the last two cited cases, all of these cases 
tose under the Judicial Code and this court repeatedly 
I 
rted that there is a that a child is 
tter off with its natural parents and it is the policy of 
courts to be reluctant to deprive parents of their children, 
D v. Social Service & Child Welfare Department, 
pra, State in the Interest of K B, supra, In re 
option of D supra, but the overriding concern 
all cases will be the welfare of the child. Wilson v. 
erce, supra, Application of Conde, supra, In re 
.12. 
i. , 
of D supra. This policy is Legislatively 
\;part of the Juvenile Courts Act, however, the policy 
ernent goes even further, it states that actions by the 
I 
Court should be to preserve and. strengthen family 
possible." Section 55-10-63, Utah Code 
1953 (emphasis added). In the instant case, 
I 
1 inquiry went no further than the marital status of the 
ies. The testimony and affidavit of the appellant were 
red by the court. The Legislative mandate of the 
nile Courts Act was rejected by the Juvenile Court. 
Appellant would have to admit that under Section 
J0-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as it existed until 
the Judicial Code contained the rule applied by the 
nile Court in the instant case. Thomas v. Children's 
Society of Ogden, 12 Utah 2d 235, 239, 364 P. 2d 
9 (1961). However, appellant would submit that the 
6amendment to Section 78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated 
J, changed that statute to include the father of an 





,j whose consent is necessary to an adoption4 
the special conditions as are hereinafter described. 
I Examination of the amended wording of Section 
h-30-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as set forth above 
that the distinction between legitimate 
I •11 
illegitimate children has been eliminated. It now 
1tates: · 
I "A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each 
living parent having rights in relation to said child, ••• '' 
The term "parent" is defined in The Random House 
ictionary of the English Language, Random House, Inc. 
rew York, 1967 as: 
"n. l. A father or a mother, . . . 3, a source, origin, 
It should also be noted that the instant fact situation is 
clearly distinguishable from that presented in Thomas v. 
Children's Aid Society of Ogden, supra. There the parents 
were seeking to overturn by habeas corpus the voluntary 
surrender of parental rights by the mother several months 
after placement of the child with the agency. The father 
took no part in any proceedings until the filing of the 
application for the writ of habeas corpus. In the instant 
case the father has been present at all hearings, has 
repeatedly attempted to gain custody of his daughter, there 
has been no voluntary giving up of parental rights by the 
mother, and these proceedings have been conducted under 
Li1e Juvenile Courts Act while the Thomas case was 
conducted under the judicial Code . 
. 14. 
1 or cause . . " 
I As applied to the instant case there is no question 
I 
I 
fut that the father of an illegitimate child must also be 
notice of the proposed termination of his rights 
rr his consent to said termination and adoption is 
! 
required if he is included in the somewhat criptic phrase: 
I 
I " ... having rights in relation to said child, ... " 
These words were chosen by the Legislature in lieu 
f the former provision. As construed by this Court in 
e Thomas decision, the former wording provided that 
e father of an illegitimate child had no parental rights 
n his child. The changed words must indicate some 
esire to change the meaning of the prior provision. It 
s submitted that this new phrase is intended to have the 
ffect of differentiating between the father of an illegitimate 
hild who has deserted his child and the mother, and a 
ather who has not deserted his child but who has fulfilled 
is duties as a father except that of legitimizing his child. 5 





T11e language would also cover and include the father of 
a legitimate child. If this were not the intent of the 
Legislature, there would have been no need to amend the' 
statute, particularly in view of the construction of the 
statute in Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of Ogden, supri' 
lf this court were to construe these words as having the 
same meaning as before the amendment was made, it woulc 
be negating the intent of the Legislature to effectuate a 
change in meaning when it effectuated the change in wording 
As has been pointed out above, Appellant has 
acknowledged the baby as being his. He has taken every 
step possible to legitimize and gain custody of his child. 
He would assert, if that were to be required, that his 
actions have legitimized the child as being his own. He 
testified he would have remarried the mother anyway if 
ti1is would not have the effect of thrusting him 
ack before the Juvenile Court because of her emotional 
'SConrmued 
three statutory methods of legitimizing a child. It is 
onceivable that a father could not do any of these yet 
ant to assume his parental duties. He was one of those 




r.srability. (R. 28-33, 36). 
If this Court were to hold that this matter is 
omehow governed by the provisions of the Judicial Code 
rather than the Juvenile Code, it is clear that either by 
the child as his own by public acknowledgment 
br by his attempts to legitimize his child, Appellant has 
rought himself under the revised provisions of Section 
%-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. To hold otherwise 
would not only be a negation of Legislative intent by this 
court, it could also constitute a denial to the Appellant 
of his rights to Equal Protection of law as guaranteed by 
the constitution of the State of Utah, and the constitution 
of the United States of America. In addition, should this 
court find this situation is governed by the Judicial Code, 
it should note that Section 78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, goes on to provide that: 
" ... except that consent is not necessary from a 
father or mother who has been judiciaJly deprived 
of the custody of the child on account of cruelty, 
neglect or desertion; ... " (emphasis added) 




,Hily three cases where consent is not necessary, that 
1 a parent has been judicially deprived of 
I 
rights for cruelty, neglect or desertion. There 
no such finding relating to the Appellant in the instant 
! 
Accordingly, to uphold the termination of Appellant's 
rights in the absence of both his consent and one 
rbese findings is not only an application of the wrong 
Ol'isions by the Juvenile Court, which should be applying 
eprovisions of the Juvenile Court Act, Section 55-10-63, 
lseq. Urnh Code Annotated, plication of that provision. 1953, it is also an erroneous Accordingly, the Court must 
verse this erroneous action and remand the case for 
oper proceedings in accord with the correct law, 
THE HOLDING OF THE JUVENILE COURT THAT THE 
FATHER OE AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD HAS NO 
LEGAL PARENTAL RIGHTS IN THAT CHILD IS 
CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE JUVENILE 
COURTS ACT AND MUST BE REVERSED BY THIS 
COURT. 
In the Juvenile Court Act of 1965, Section 55-10-63 
123, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the term parent is 
owhere defined. However, Section Utah 
.18. 
Annotated, 1953, states: 
"The provisions of this Act, to the extent that they 
are substantially the same as existing statutory 
provisions relating to the same· subject matter, shall 
be construed as restatements and continuations thereof 
and not as new enactments. " l 
Application of this provision would require that examinatio• 
of the Act existing before 1965 be undertaken to determine · 
whether or not the term "parent" was defined, and if so, 
I 1t could be .applied to define the use of the term "parent" 
ln the prov1s1ons of the 1965 Act. It was defined in the 
prior act and that definition was: 
"Parent" when used in relation to a child, shall 
include guardian and every person who is 
liable to maintain a child. " 
Section-55-10-64 (3) Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
As discussed in Point I (C) infra, pursuant to the terms 
of Section 77 -60-1, et seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
the father of an illegitimate child is by law liable to 
maintain his child. This is consistent with the policies 
of the Juvenile Court Act as set forth in Section 55-10-63, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and discussed in Point I (C) 
. 19. 
) 
l:iif;:i. It is therefore clear that Appellant is a parent 
I 
within the meaning and intent of the Juvenile Court Act. 
li is clear from the record that this _definition was 
vnlied and appellant was recognized as the father of his 
,l 
[:i]d by the Court. (R. 1). 
Accordingly, appellant would be entitled to all the 
onsiderations of the policy requirements expressed in 
0crion 55-10-63, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, before 
Juvenile Court deprived him of his parental rights 
,der Section 55-10-109, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
sis required by Section 55-10-100 (18) Utah Code 
nnotated, 1953. 
Since the appellant would be included under the term 
rarem" as used i11 the Juvenile Court Act as pointed 
ut above, the Juvenile Court erred in holding that he 
d no standing as a parent before the court as the father 
an illegitimate child. The sole basis for terminating 
s parental rights as a parent under the Juvenile Court 






oi· (c). Being the father of an illegitimate child is not 
one of the grounds included in these provisions. 
I 
I Accordingly, that ruling of the Juvenile Court must be 
reversed and remanded for further consideration in 
accord with the applicable provisions of the Juvenile 
Court Act, Section 55-10-63 et seq. Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
C. IT IS TI-IE POLICY OF THE LAWS OF UTAH TO 
ENCOURAGE AND PROMOTE THE ESTABLISHING 
OF A NORMAL HOUSEHOLD BY THE PARENTS OF 
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD WITH THE CONCOMI-
TANT LEGITIMIZATION OF THE CHILD AND THE 
RULE ADOPTED BY THE JUVENILE COURT, 
TO-WIT: THAT THE FATHER OF AN ILLEGITIMATE 
CHILD HAS NO PARENTAL RIGHTS IN HIS CHILD 
WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THIS POLICY. 
Section 55-10-63, Utah Code 1953, states: 
"It is the purpose of this act to secure for each 
child coming before the Juvenile Court such care, 
guidance and control, preferably in his own home, 
as will serve his welfare and the best interests of 
the state; to preserve and strengthen family ties 
whenever possible; . . . " 
The best interests of the state and the preservation 
and strengthening of family ties are most clearly 
. 21. 
i 
l1 ... 1 .. t. 1ced by encouraging the assumption of paternal Jll \ '- 1 
junc:s and responsibilities by the father of an illegitimate 
cnild. This is not only a matter of obvious public policy, 
i[ is:; rirntter of law. The laws of Utah both encourage 
and force the normalization of a family by encouraging 
11:·,e rather of an illegitimate child to assume the proper 
cutics as a father and husband. At common-law, children 
tern out of lawful wedlock could not be rendered legitimate 
by any subsequent act of their parents. The illegitimate 
child was regarded as the child of no one, not even entitled 
to a name unless he gained one by reputation. He could 
;,ot inherit either through his father or his mother. 
The sole duty his parents owed him was that of maintenance 
because of the ties of nature. However, as stated by this 
Court: 
"Even under the cold and pitiless rules of the 
common law, which were conceived and enforced 
to shield and protect the royalty and nobility of 
England against the consequences of their sexual 
derelictions, the putative fathen: of an illegitimate 
child had rights respecting it which ordinarily were 
paramount to all the· world except the mother. " 
Harrison v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 P. 716, 724 
\1914). 
. 22. 
I ·;_ o modify the harsh rule of the common law, the 
\ 
uah Legislature has provided three statutory procedures 
by which a putative father may make an illegitimate child 
legitimate. Section 77-60-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
which provides that the illegitimate child becomes legitimat1 
by the subsequent marriage of the parents, Section 74-4-10, 
utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides that an 
illegitimate child is the heir of the person who acknowledgeE 
himself to be the father of such a child, and Section 
7S-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides 
that the child may become legitimate by public acknowledg-
ment. 
Under the facts of the instant case the decision of 
the Juvenile Court must be examined in light of the 
provisions of Section 78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
"The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly 
acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such 
with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into 
his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a 
legitimate child, -t:hereby adopts it as such, and 
. 23. 
l..'.hi1d is thereupon deemed for all purposes 
L;.:;ttimcitc from the time of its birth. The 
foregoing provisions of this chapter do not apply 
to such an adoption. " 
tccord here affirmatively shows that Appellant 
r 1cly acknowledged that Baby Girl McMurtrey was his 
I c":ild. He stated in open court, under oath, at the 
I 
February 26, 1969, that he was the father of the 
c::ild, (R. 29) that he desired custody of the child, 30) 
.ie was once married to the mother of the child, (R. 27) 
chat al though he and the mother were divorced at 
the rime of the birth of the child, they had planned to 
re-marry and establish a home for the child after it had 
been born. (R. 28-29). If further public acknowledgment 
were needed, the record also contains Appellant's petition 
or custody with his affidavits in support thereof, which 
·ncludes a statement of his acknowledgment of paternity 
nd his desire to gain custody of his child. (R. 47 -SO). 
This court has held that: 
"The essentials to a legitimation are public 
acknowledgment by the father, receiving of the 
. 24. 
1..:hild into his family and treatment of it as a 
lcgi tin-1atc child." In re Garr' s Estate, 31 
Cwh 57, 86 P. 757, 761, (1906). 
The appellant here meets all these requirements 
c:::ccpt that of having received the child into the home. This 
not be effectuated solely because of the intervention 
of social workers of the State Division of Family Services 
who removed the child from the hospital three days after 
hc:r birth, took her away to a paid foster care household 
a11d the erroneous ruling of the Juvenile Court which 
?:·ohibited the appellant from giving his child the love, 
care and home he had anticipated providing. 
This child could have been ma:le legitimate by the 
wbsequent marriage of the parents. Section 7 4-4-10, 
Code Annotated, 1953. Indeed this was contemplated 
I by them. However, because of the action for permanent 
oeprivation of parental rights, in the first instance, and 
because of the court's finding that the mother is 
rnable to properly care for and nurture the child as a 
result of her severe and disabling emotional and 
• 25. 
problems. (R. 44), the appellant is 
) ' . 
I 
1 D!Jced in a dilemma. If he married the mother, the child 
wJl t..:.:come legitimate, but the parents will probably 
i 
' be forced to defend a deprivation action on the basis 
of ri1e juvenile Court's action in the case regarding the 
' I 
i rnoth2r. If he does not marry the mother and legitimize 
I 
\ 
f :he child, the Juvenile Court's holding, if let stand by 
, this Court, would hold he has no legal interest in his child. 
appellant has done everything he could to legitimize 
!':ls c:1iJd and gain custody of her. The tragic irony is 
' :hat rhe actions and rulings of the Juvenile Court have 
bEa-r2d him from legitimizing his child, yet it is this 
same lack of legitimization that is being used by the 
1 Juvenile Court as the basis for permanently terminating 
his pl rental rights without examining his fitness as a 
parcm. Clearly this is a violation, not only of the 
, policies of the law, but of fundamental fairness, that is, 




r:1c dppcllant had not chosen to act as he has, 
t"· ·s anempting to assume his parental responsibilities, JJ-.1l J. ' 
lt is clear that the Laws of Utah would force him to assume 
u'h::m. Tl12 mother, through the State, could have 
him for the "crime" of bastardy, Section 
r 
77-60-1 w 16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. If "convicted" 
appellant would have been forced to acknowledge and 
fupport his child; thereby legitimizing it. The mother 
F public authority chargeable by law with the support 
I 
1f rh.e child could have brought an action for paternity 
'1 
which, if the putative father were held to be the father, 
vould result in his.iacknowledgment" and support of his 
Section 78-45a-l to 17, Utah Code Annotated, 
The duties established by these actions can be 
rforced in other states. Section 78-45-1 to 13, Utah 
rde Annotated, 1953. The statutory scheme thus 
in Utah seeks to "encourage" the father of an 
! 
fegitimate child to assume his duties and responsibilities 
and husband, and, if he does not respond, it 
. 27. 
,,i'_;::o cllc n-1.lchinery to force him to do so. The 
' 
,;,.«;:: ci rhc ] uvenile Court in the instant case is 
,: contrary to these policies and must be reversed. 
_::o ifOfiJC tilat it is the appellant, not the Juvenile 
Coe,.-:, w;10 is seeking to effectuate these policies and laws. 
POINT II. 
';''.,i:: JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN PERMANENTLY 
ALL PARENTAL RIGHTS OF 
;\??ELLANT IN HIS CHILD WHERE IT FAILED TO 
:'I:\D THAT IN REGARD TO APPELLANT THERE 
\:YAS EXISTING ANY CONDITION WITHIN SECTION 
55-10-109, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
The sole authority for the permanent termination 
'p;;.r2m:J rights by the Juvenile Court is Section 55-10-109, 
Co(]C Annotated, 1953. Any order of permanent 
rlilir:ation of parental rights must be based on one of 
erhree conditions set forth in subsection (l)(a), (l)(b), 
\(l;(c) of that statute. Since permanent termination 
! 
p;::·enrnl rights is such a drastic remedy, not only 
1st the condition upon which the deprivation is based 
I 
of Lhose set forth in subsection (1), but also 
. 28. 
---
· :::ic:2;..:ir:.g to establish the basis has the burden 
· r· that the condition exists. State in Interest ••;::, 
Utah 2d p ---
l. 11181, filed January 19, 1970). As was 
:a'": :N this court in this recent decision: 1,.\.,-1...• ., 
''Depriv<;.tion of the parents' custody of their children 
is a drastic remedy which should be resorted to 
c:;',.y in extreme cases and when it is manifest that 
r:.2 ;;ome itself cannot or will not correct the evils 
w:1icl1 exist. A cutting of family ties is a step of 
L:t:T1ost gravity and is undesirable, both socially 
::i.nd economically, and should be avoided unless 
is the only alternative to be found consistent 
wir'.1 the best interests of the children. · There is 
a presumption that it is generally for the best 
incerest and welfare of children to be reared under 
the care of their natural parents. Under this 
presumption, the burden of persuading the trier 
cf fc;cr is al ways on the person who claims that 
n will be for the best interests of the child to 
be reared by someone other than the natural 
parents of such child. To support a decision 
to deprive a parent of its child the court must 
fir:::;t be convinced of such fact by a preponderance 
of the evidence. " 
It is clear from examination of the transcript 
It>· proceedings (R. 1-37) and the Findings of Fact and 
'crce entered in this matter (R. 44-45), there was no 
i 
into any of the three grounds which form the basis 
. 29. 
, deprivation under the provisions of 
' 
cnOii SS-10-109(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to-wit: 
a coi1Jirion seriously detrimental to the child, (b) 
if,, .. · .cnt of the child by the parent or parents, (c) 
!u;\; o: refusal of the parent or parents to give the child 
ipc;· parental care and protection after a period of trial. 
:orC1r:gly, there is no authority for or basis upon which 
jL1vcnile Court could permanently terminate the parental 
nts of fae Appellant and the court's order permanently 
the Appellant's parental rights in his child, 
y Cirl McMurrrey, must be reversed by this court. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Juvenile Court permanently terminated 
ellam' s parental rights in his daughter on the sole 
s that he was not the legal father of the child in 
ruvemion of the applicable laws of the State of Utah, 
hc,dit:g must be reversed. Under the Juvenile Court 
the father of an illegitimate child is considered as 
oft he child. The sole method of and basis 
. 30 
-· \\illc:1 his parental rights may be terminated U}'J, 
pe1·rnJ:·1cntly is by finding that one of the conditions 
ser in Section 55-15-109 (1), (a), (b) or (c) exist. 
No ,:;den condition was found to exist in the instant case. 
the decision of the Juvenile Court must be 
'I 
I 
reversed and this matter reversed for further consideration! 
[Mt court. I 
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